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Abstract—Current smartphone operating systems regulate ap-
plication permissions by prompting users on an ask-on-first-use
basis. Prior research has shown that this method is ineffective
because it fails to account for context: the circumstances under
which an application first requests access to data may be vastly
different than the circumstances under which it subsequently
requests access. We performed a longitudinal 131-person field
study to analyze the contextuality behind user privacy decisions
to regulate access to sensitive resources. We built a classifier
to make privacy decisions on the user’s behalf by detecting
when context has changed and, when necessary, inferring privacy
preferences based on the user’s past decisions and behavior.
Our goal is to automatically grant appropriate resource requests
without further user intervention, deny inappropriate requests,
and only prompt the user when the system is uncertain of the
user’s preferences. We show that our approach can accurately
predict users’ privacy decisions 96.8% of the time, which is a
four-fold reduction in error rate compared to current systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the roles of a mobile application platform is to
help users avoid unexpected or unwanted use of their per-
sonal data [10]. Mobile platforms currently use permission
systems to regulate access to sensitive resources, relying on
user prompts to determine whether a third-party application
should be granted or denied access to data and resources.
One critical caveat in this approach, however, is that mobile
platforms seek the consent of the user the first time a given
application attempts to access a certain data type and then
enforce the user’s decision for all subsequent cases, regardless
of the circumstances surrounding each access. For example, a
user may grant an application access to location data because
she is using location-based features, but by doing this, the ap-
plication can subsequently access location data for behavioral
advertising, which may violate the user’s preferences.
Earlier versions of Android (5.1 and below) asked users to
make privacy decisions during application installation as an
all-or-nothing ultimatum (ask-on-install): either all requested
permissions are approved or the application is not installed.
Previous research showed that few people read the requested
permissions at install-time and even fewer correctly under-
stood them [15]. Furthermore, install-time permissions do not
present users with the context in which those permission will
be exercised, which may cause users to make suboptimal de-
cisions not aligned with their actual preferences. For example,
Egelman et al. observed that when an application requests
access to location data without providing context, users are
just as likely to see this as a signal for desirable location-
based features as they are an invasion of privacy [9]. Asking
users to make permission decisions at runtime—at the moment
when the permission will actually be used by the application—
provides more context (i.e., what they were doing at the
time that data was requested) [13]. However, due to the high
frequency of permission requests, it is not feasible to prompt
the user every time data is accessed [38].
In iOS and Android M, the user is now prompted at runtime
the first time an application attempts to access one of a
set of “dangerous” permission types (e.g., location, contacts,
etc.). This ask-on-first-use (AOFU) model is an improvement
over ask-on-install (AOI). Prompting users the first time an
application uses one of the designated permissions gives users
a better sense of context: their knowledge of what they were
doing when the application first tried to access the data should
help them determine whether the request is appropriate. How-
ever, Wijesekera et al. showed that AOFU fails to meet user
expectations over half the time, because it does not account
for the varying contexts of future requests [38].
The notion of contextual integrity suggests that many per-
mission models fail to protect user privacy because they fail
to account for the context surrounding data flows [29]. That
is, privacy violations occur when sensitive resources are used
in ways that defy users’ expectations. We posit that more
effective permission models must focus on whether resource
accesses are likely to defy users’ expectations in a given
context—not simply whether the application was authorized to
receive data the first time it asked for it. Thus, the challenge
for system designers is to correctly infer when the context
surrounding a data request has changed, and whether the new
context is likely to be deemed “appropriate” or “inappropriate”
for the given user. Dynamically regulating data access based
on the context requires more user involvement to understand
users’ contextual preferences. If users are asked to make
privacy decisions too frequently, or under circumstances that
are seen as low-risk, they may become habituated to future,
more serious, privacy decisions. On the other hand, if users are
asked to make too few privacy decisions, they may find that
the system has acted against their wishes. Thus, our goal is to
automatically determine when and under what circumstances
to present users with runtime prompts.
To this end, we collected real-world Android usage data in
order to explore whether we could infer users’ future privacy
decisions based on their past privacy decisions, contextual
circumstances surrounding applications’ data requests, and
users’ behavioral traits. We conducted a field study where
131 participants used Android phones that were instrumented
to gather data over an average of 32 days per participant.
Also, their phones periodically prompted them to make privacy
decisions when applications used sensitive permissions, and
we logged their decisions. Overall, participants wanted to
block 60% of these requests. We found that AOFU yields 84%
accuracy, i.e., its policy agrees with participants’ prompted
responses 84% of the time. AOI achieves only 25% accuracy.
We designed new techniques that use machine learning to
automatically predict how users would respond to prompts, so
that we can avoid prompting them in most cases, thereby re-
ducing user burden. Our classifier uses the user’s past decisions
in related situations to predict their response to a particular
permission prompt. The classifier outputs a prediction and
a confidence score; if the classifier is sufficiently confident,
we use its prediction, otherwise we prompt the user for their
decision. We also incorporate information about the user’s
behavior in other security and privacy situations to make
inferences about their preferences: whether they have a screen
lock activated, how often they visit HTTPS websites, and so
on. We show that our scheme achieves 95% accuracy (a 4×
reduction in error rate over AOFU) with significantly less user
involvement than the status quo.
The specific contributions of our work are the following:
• We conducted the first known large-scale study on quan-
tifying the effectiveness of ask-on-first-use permissions.
• We show that a significant portion of the studied par-
ticipants make contextual decisions on permissions us-
ing the foreground application and the visibility of the
permission-requesting application.
• We show how a machine-learned model can incorporate
context and better predict users’ privacy decisions.
• To our knowledge, we are the first to use passively
observed traits to infer future privacy decisions on a case-
by-case basis at runtime.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a large body of work demonstrating that install-
time prompts fail because users do not understand or pay
attention to them [17], [21], [37]. When using install-time
prompts, users often do not understand which permission
types correspond to which sensitive resources and are sur-
prised by the ability of background applications to collect
information [15], [20], [36]. Applications also transmit a large
amount of location or other sensitive data to third parties
without user consent [10]. When possible risks associated with
these requests are revealed to users, their concerns range from
annoyance to wanting to seek retribution [14].
To mitigate some of these problems, systems have been
developed to track information flows across the Android
system [10], [16], [22] or introduce finer-grained permission
control into Android [1], [19], [34], but many of these solu-
tions increase user involvement significantly, which can lead to
habituation. Additionally, many of these proposals are useful
only to the most-motivated or technically savvy users. For
example, many such systems require users to configure com-
plicated control panels, which many are unlikely to do [40].
Other approaches involve static analysis in order to better
understand how applications could request information [3], [7],
[12], but these say little about how applications actually use
information. Dynamic analysis improves upon this by allowing
users to see how often this information is requested in real
time [10], [35], [38], but substantial work is likely needed
to present that information to average users in a meaningful
way. Solutions that require runtime prompts (or other user
interruptions) need to also minimize user intervention, in order
to prevent habituation.
Other researchers have developed recommendation systems
to recommend applications based on users’ privacy prefer-
ences [41]. Systems have also been developed to predict
what users would share on mobile social networks [6], which
suggests that future systems could potentially infer what infor-
mation users would be willing to share with third-party appli-
cations. By requiring users to self-report privacy preferences,
clustering algorithms have been used to define user privacy
profiles even in the face of diverse preferences [33]. However,
researchers have found that the order in which information is
requested has an impact on prediction accuracy [39], which
could mean that such systems are only likely to be accurate
when they examine actual user behavior over time (rather than
relying on one-time self-reports).
Liu et al. clustered users by privacy preferences and used
ML techniques to predict whether to allow or deny an appli-
cation’s request for sensitive user data [25]. However, their
dataset was collected from a set of highly privacy-conscious
individuals—those choosing to install a permission-control
mechanism. Furthermore, the researchers removed “conflict-
ing” user decisions, in which a user chose to deny a permission
for an application, and then later chose to allow it. However,
these conflicting decisions happen nearly 50% of the time in
the real world [38], and accurately reflect the nuances of user
privacy preferences; they are not experimental mistakes, and
therefore models need to account for them. In fact, previous
work found that users commonly reassess privacy preferences
after usage [2]. Liu et al. also expect users to make 10% of per-
mission decisions manually, which, based on field study results
from Wijesekera et al., would result in being prompted every
three minutes [38]. This is obviously impractical. Our goal is
to design a system that can automatically make decisions on
behalf of users, that accurately models their preferences, while
also not over-burdening them with repeated requests.
Closely related to this work, Liu et al. [24] performed a
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field study to measure the effectiveness of a Privacy Assistant
that offers recommendations to users on privacy settings that
they could adopt based on each user’s privacy profile—the
privacy assistant predicts what the user might want based on
the inferred privacy profile and static analysis of the third-party
application. While this approach increased user awareness on
resource usage, the recommendations are static: they do not
consider each application’s access to sensitive data on a case-
by-case basis. Such a coarse-grained approach goes against
previous work suggesting that people do want to vary their
decisions based on contextual circumstances [38]. A blanket
approval or denial of a permission to a given application car-
ries a considerable risk of privacy violations or loss of desired
functionality. In contrast, our work tries to infer the appro-
priateness of a given request by considering the surrounding
contextual cues and how the user has behaved in similar
situations in the past, in order to make decisions on a case-by-
case basis using dynamic analysis. Their dataset was collected
from a set of highly privacy-conscious and considerably tech-
savvy individuals, which might limit the generalization of their
claims and findings, whereas we conducted a field study on a
more representative sample.
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity suggests that
permission models should focus on information flows that are
likely to defy user expectations [29]. There are three main
components involved in deciding the appropriateness of a
flow [5]: the context in which the resource request is made, the
role played by the agent requesting the resource (i.e., the role
played by the application under the current context), and the
type of resource being accessed. Neither previous nor currently
deployed permission models take all three factors into account.
This model could be used to improve permission models
by automatically granting access to data when the system
determines that it is appropriate, denying access when it is
inappropriate, and prompting the user only when a decision
cannot be made automatically, thereby reducing user burden.
Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) were proposed as a mech-
anism to tie sensitive resource access to certain UI ele-
ments [30]–[32]. Authors posit that such an approach will
increase user expectations since a significant portion of par-
ticipants expected a UI interaction before a sensitive resource
usage, giving users an implicit mechanism to control access
and increasing the awareness on resource usage. The biggest
caveat in this approach is tying a UI interaction to each
sensitive resource access is practically impossible due to the
high frequency at which these resources are accessed [38], and
due to the fact that many legitimate resource accesses occur
without user initiation [13].
Wijesekera et al. performed a field study [38] to opera-
tionalize the notion of “context,” so that an operating system
can differentiate between appropriate and inappropriate data
requests by a single application for a single data type. They
found that users’ decisions to allow a permission request were
significantly correlated with that application’s visibility: in
this case, the context is using or not using the requesting
application. They posit visibility of the application could be
Permission Type Activity
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE View nearby SSIDs
NFC Communicate via NFC
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS Read users’ browser history
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Read GPS location
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
Read network-inferred location
(i.e., cell tower and/or WiFi)
LOCATION_HARDWARE Directly access GPS data
READ_CALL_LOG Read call history
ADD_VOICEMAIL Read call history
READ_SMS Read sent/received/draft SMS
SEND_SMS Send SMS
*INTERNET Access Internet when roaming
*WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS
Change application sync
settings when roaming
TABLE I
FELT ET AL. PROPOSED GRANTING A SELECT SET OF 12 PERMISSIONS AT
RUNTIME SO THAT USERS HAVE CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION TO INFER
WHY THE DATA MIGHT BE NEEDED [13]. OUR INSTRUMENTATION OMITS
THE LAST TWO PERMISSION TYPES (INTERNET& WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS)
AND RECORDS INFORMATION ABOUT THE OTHER 10.
a strong contextual cue that influences users’ responses to
permission prompts. They also observed that privacy decisions
were highly nuanced, and therefore a one-size-fits-all model
is unlikely to be sufficient; a given information flow may be
deemed appropriate by one user and inappropriate by another
user. They recommended applying machine learning in order
to infer individual users’ privacy preferences.
To achieve this, research is needed to determine what factors
affect user privacy decisions and how to use those factors to
make privacy decisions on the user’s behalf. While we cannot
automatically capture everything involved in Nissenbaum’s
notion of context, we can try for the next-best thing: we can try
to detect when context has likely changed (insofar as to decide
whether or not a different privacy decision should be made
for the same application and data type), by seeing whether
the circumstances surrounding a data request are similar to
previous requests or not.
III. METHODOLOGY
We collected data from 131 participants to understand what
factors could be used to infer whether a permission request is
likely to be deemed appropriate by the user.
Previous work by Felt et al. made the argument that certain
permissions are appropriate for runtime prompts, because
they protect sensitive resources—and therefore require user
intervention—and because viewing the prompt at runtime
imparts additional contextual information about why an ap-
plication might need the permission [13]. Similarly, Thomp-
son et al. showed that other permission requests could be
replaced with audit mechanisms, because they represent either
reversible changes or are low enough risk to not warrant
habituating the user to prompts [36]. We collected infor-
mation about 10 of the 12 permissions Felt et al. suggest
are best-suited for runtime prompts; we omitted INTERNET
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Fig. 1. A screenshot of an ESM prompt.
and WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS, since we did not expect any
participant to be roaming while using our instrumentation, and
focused on the remaining 10 permission types (Table I). While
there are many other sensitive permissions beyond this set,
Felt et al. concluded that the others are best handled by other
mechanisms (e.g., install-time prompts, ACGs, etc.).
We used the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) to collect
ground truth data about users’ privacy preferences [18]. ESM
involves repeatedly questioning participants in situ about a
recently observed event; in this case, we probabilistically asked
them about an application’s recent access to data on their
phone, and whether they would have permitted it, if they had
been given the choice. We treated participants’ responses to
these ESM probes as our main dependent variable (Figure 1).
We also instrumented participants’ smartphones to obtain
data about their privacy-related behaviors and the frequency
with which applications accessed protected resources. The
instrumentation required a set of modifications to the Android
operating system and flashing a custom Android version onto
participants’ devices. To facilitate such experiments, the Uni-
versity of Buffalo offers non-affiliated academic researchers
access to the PhoneLab panel [28], which consists of more
than 200 participants. All of these participants had LG Nexus
5 phones running Android 5.1.1 and the phones were period-
ically updated over-the-air (OTA) with custom modifications
to the Android operating system. Participants can decide when
to install the OTA update, which marks their entry into new
experiments. During our experiment period, different partic-
ipants installed the OTA update with our instrumentation at
Type Event Recorded
Behavioral
Instrumentation
Changing developer options
Opening/Closing security settings
Changing security settings
Enabling/Disabling NFC
Changing location mode
Opening/Closing location settings
Changing screen-lock type
Use of two factor authentication
Log initial settings information
User locks the screen
Screen times out
App locks the screen
Audio mode changed
Enabling/Disabling speakerphone
Connecting/Disconnecting headphones
Muting the phone
Taking an audio call
Taking a picture (selfie vs. non-selfie)
Visiting an HTTPS link in Chrome
Responding to a notification
Unlocking the phone
Runtime
Information
An application changing the visibility
Platform switches to a new activity
Permission
Requests
An app requests a sensitive permission
ESM prompt for a selected permission
TABLE II
INSTRUMENTED EVENTS THAT FORM OUR FEATURE SET
different times, thus we neither have data on all PhoneLab
participants, nor for the entire period. Our OTA update was
available to participants for a period of six weeks, between
February 2016 and March 2016. At the end of the study
period, we emailed participants a link to an exit survey to
collect demographic information. Our study was approved by
the relevant institutional review board (IRB).
A. Instrumentation
The goal of our instrumentation was to collect as much
runtime and behavioral data as could be observed from the
Android platform, with minimal impact on performance. We
collected three categories of data: behavioral information,
runtime information, and user decisions. We made no modifi-
cations to any third-party application code, which means that
our dynamic analysis techniques could be used on any third-
party Android application.
Table II contains the complete list of behavioral and runtime
events our instrumentation recorded. The behavioral data fell
under several categories, all chosen based on several hypothe-
ses that we had about the types of behaviors that might
correlate with privacy preferences: web browsing behavior,
screen locking behavior, third party application usage behav-
ior, audio preferences, call habits, camera usage patterns (selfie
vs. non-selfie), and behavior related to security settings. For
example, we hypothesized that someone who manually locks
their device screen (as opposed to letting it time out) might
be more privacy-conscious than someone who takes many
speakerphone calls or selfies.
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We also collected runtime information about the context
of each permission request, including the visibility of the
requesting application at the time of request (i.e., whether
it was running in the foreground or not) and what the user
was doing when the request was made (i.e., the name of
the foreground application). The visibility of an application
reflects the extent to which the user was likely aware that
the application was running; if the application was in the
foreground, the user had cues that the application was running,
but if it was in the background, then the user was likely not
aware that the application was running and therefore might
find the permission request unexpected. We also collected in-
formation about which Android Activity was active in the
application;1 depending on the design of the application, this
might tell us only that the user was browsing with Firefox or
might provide fine-grained information such as differentiating
between reading a news feed vs. searching for a user’s profile
on Facebook. We monitored processes’ memory priority levels
to determine the visibility of all active processes.
We recorded every time that an application used one of the
10 permissions mentioned earlier. We also recorded the exact
Android API invoked by a third-party application to determine
precisely what information was requested.
Finally, once per day we randomly selected one of these
permission requests and prompted the user about them at
runtime (Figure 1). We used weighted reservoir sampling
to select a permission request to prompt about. We weight
permissions based on their frequency of occurrence seen by
the instrumentation; the most-frequent permission request has
a higher probability of being shown to participants using ESM.
We prompted participants a maximum of three times for each
unique combination of requesting application, permission, and
visibility of the requesting application (i.e., background vs.
foreground). We tuned the wording of the prompt to make
it clear that the request had just occurred and their response
would not affect the system (a deny response would not
actually deny data). These responses serve as the ground truth
for all the analysis mentioned in the remainder of the paper.
The intuition behind using weighted reservoir sampling is
to focus more on the frequently occurring permission requests
over rare ones. Common permission requests contribute most
to user habituation due their high frequency. Thus, it is more
important to learn about user privacy decisions on highly
frequent permission requests over the rare ones, which might
not risk user habituation or annoyance (and the context of rare
requests may be less likely to change).
B. Exit Survey
At the end of our data collection period, PhoneLab staff
emailed participants a link to our online exit survey, which
they were incentivized to complete with a raffle for two $100
Amazon gift cards. The survey gathered demographic informa-
tion and qualitative information on their privacy preferences.
1An Android Activity represents the application screen and UI elements
currently exposed to the user.
Of the 203 participants in our experiment, 53 fully completed
the survey, and another 14 partially completed it. Of the 53
participants to fully complete the survey, 21 were male, 31
were female, and 1 undisclosed. Participants ranged from
20 to 72 years of age (µ = 40.83, σ= 14.32). Participants
identified themselves as 39.3% staff, 32.1% students, 19.6%
faculty, and 9% other. Only 21% of the survey respondents
had an academic qualification in STEM, which suggests that
the sample is unlikely to be biased towards tech-savvy users.
C. Summary
We collected data from February 5 to March 17, 2016.
PhoneLab allows any participant to opt-out of an experiment
at any time. Thus, of the 203 participants who installed our
custom Android build, there were 131 who used it for more
than 20 days. During the study period, we collected 176M
events across all participants (31K events per participant/day).
Our dataset consists of 1,686 unique applications and 13K
unique activities. Participants also responded to 4,636 prompts
during the study period. We logged 96M sensitive permission
requests, which translates to roughly one sensitive permission
request every 6 seconds per participant. For the remainder of
the paper, we only consider the data from the 131 participants
who used the system for at least 20 days, which corresponds
to 4,224 ESM prompts.
Of the 4,224 prompts, 55.3% were in response to ACCESS
_WIFI_STATE, when trying to access Wifi SSID information
that could be used to infer the location of the smartphone;
21.0%, 17.3%, 5.08%, 0.78%, and 0.54% were from accessing
location directly, reading SMS, sending SMS, reading call
logs, and accessing browser history, respectively. A total of
137 unique applications triggered prompts during the study
period. Of the 4,224 prompts, participants wanted to deny
60.01% of them, and 57.65% of the prompts were shown when
the requesting application was running in the foreground or
the user had visual cues that the application was running (e.g.,
notifications). A Wilcoxon signed rank test with continuity
correction revealed a statistically significant difference in par-
ticipants’ desire to allow or deny a permission request based
on the visibility of the requesting application (p < 0.0152,
r = 0.221), which corroborates previous findings [38].
IV. TYPES OF USERS
We hypothesized that there may be different types of users
based on how they want to disclose their private information
with third parties. It is imperative to identify these different
sub-populations since different permission models affect users
differently based on their privacy preferences; performance
numbers averaged across a user population could be mislead-
ing since different sub-populations might react differently to
the same permission model.
While our study size was too small to effectively apply
clustering techniques to generate classes of users, we did
find a meaningful distinction using the denial rate (i.e., the
percentage of prompts to which users wanted to deny access).
We aggregated users by their denial rate in 10% increments
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Fig. 2. Histogram of users based on their denial rate. Defaulters tended to
allow or deny almost all requests without regard for contextual cues, whereas
Contextuals considered the visibility of the requesting application.
and examined how these different participants considered the
surrounding contextual circumstances in their decisions.
We discovered that application visibility was a significant
factor for users with a denial rate of 10–90%, but not for
users with a denial rate of 0–10% or 90–100%. We call the
former group Contextuals, as they care about the surrounding
context (i.e., they make nuanced decisions), and the latter
group Defaulters, because, as we now show, they don’t seem
to take the surrounding context into account when they make
privacy decisions.
Defaulters accounted for 53% of 131 participants and Con-
textuals accounted for 47%. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test with
continuity correction revealed a statistically significant differ-
ence in Contextuals’ responses based on requesting application
visibility (p < 0.013, r = 0.312), while for Defaulters
there was no statistically significant difference (p = 0.227,
r = 0.215). That is, Contextuals used visibility as a contextual
cue, when deciding the appropriateness of a given permission
request, whereas Defaulters did not vary their decisions based
on this cue. Figure 2 shows the distribution of users based on
their denial rate. Vertical lines indicate the borders between
Contextuals (light gray) and Defaulters (dark gray). Observe
that Defaulters appear at both ends of the denial-rate spectrum,
while Contextuals fully occupy the space between them.
In the remainder of the paper, we use our Contextuals–
Defaulters categorization to measure how current and pro-
posed models affect these two sub-populations, issues unique
to these sub-populations, and ways to address these issues.
V. ASK-ON-FIRST-USE PERMISSIONS
Ask-on-first-use (AOFU) is the current Android permission
model, which was first adopted in Android 6.0 (Marshmallow).
AOFU works by prompting the user whenever an applica-
tion requests a dangerous permission for the first time; the
user’s response to this prompt is thereafter applied whenever
the same application requests the same permission. As of
November 2016, only 24.3% of Android users have Android
Policy Contextuals Defaulters Overall Prompts
AOI 44.11% 6.00% 25.00% 0.00
AOFU-AP 64.49% 93.33% 84.61% 12.34
AOFU-APV 64.28% 92.85% 83.33% 15.79
AOFU-AFPV 66.67% 98.95% 84.61% 16.91
AOFU-VP 58.65% 94.44% 78.04% 6.43
AOFU-VA 63.39% 93.75% 84.21% 12.24
AOFU-A 64.27% 93.54% 83.33% 9.06
AOFU-P 57.95% 95.45% 82.14% 3.84
AOFU-V 52.27% 95.34% 81.48% 2.00
TABLE III
THE ACCURACY AND NUMBER OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE ASK-ON-FIRST-
USE COMBINATIONS. A: APPLICATION REQUESTING THE PERMISSION, P:
PERMISSION TYPE REQUESTED, V: VISIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION
REQUESTING THE PERMISSION, AF : APPLICATION RUNNING IN THE
FOREGROUND WHEN THE REQUEST IS MADE. AOFU-AP IS THE POLICY
USED IN ANDROID MARSHMALLOW I.E., ASKING (PROMPTING) THE USER
FOR EACH UNIQUE APPLICATION, PERMISSION COMBINATION. THE TABLE
ALSO DIFFERENTIATES POLICY NUMBERS BASED ON THE SUBPOPULATION
OF Contextuals, Defaulters, AND ACROSS ALL USERS.
Marshmallow or a higher version [8], and of those, those
who have upgraded from a previous version only see runtime
permission prompts for freshly-installed applications.
For the remaining 75.7% of users, the system policy is
ask-on-install (AOI), which automatically allows all runtime
permission requests. During the study period, all of our partic-
ipants had AOI running as the default permission model. Be-
cause all runtime permission requests are allowed in AOI, any
of our ESM prompts that the user wanted to deny correspond
to mispredictions under the AOI model (i.e., the AOI model
granted access to the data against users’ actual preferences).
Table III shows the expected median accuracy for AOI, as
well as several other possible variants that we discuss in this
section. The low median accuracy for Defaulters was due to
the significant number of people who simply denied most of
the prompts. The prompt count is zero for AOI because it
does not prompt the user during runtime; users are only shown
permission prompts at installation.
More users will have AOFU in the future, as they upgrade
to Android 6.0 and beyond. To the best of our knowledge,
no prior work has looked into quantifying the effectiveness of
AOFU systematically; this section presents analysis of AOFU
based on prompt responses collected from participants and cre-
ates a baseline against which to measure our system’s improve-
ment. We simulate how AOFU performs through our ESM
prompt responses. Because AOFU is deterministic, each user’s
response to the first prompt for each application:permission
combination tells us how the AOFU model would respond for
subsequent requests by that same combination. For participants
who responded to more than one prompt for each combination,
we can quantify how often AOFU would have been correct for
subsequent requests. Similarly, we also measure the accuracy
for other possible policies that the platform could use to decide
whether to prompt the user. For example, the status quo is
for the platform to prompt the user for each new applica-
tion:permission combination, but how would accuracy (and the
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number of prompts shown) change if the policy were to prompt
on all new combinations of application:permission:visibility?
Table III shows the expected median accuracy2 for each
policy based on participants’ responses. For each policy, A
represents the application requesting the permission, P repre-
sents the requested permission, V represents the visibility of
the requesting application, and AF represents the application
running in the foreground when a sensitive permission request
was made. For instance, AOFU-AP is the policy where the
user will be prompted for each new instance of an applica-
tion:permission combination, which is the Android 6.0 model.
The last column shows the number of runtime prompts a
participant would see under each policy over the duration
of the study, if that policy were to be implemented. Both
AOFU-AP and AOFU-AFPV show about a 4.9× reduction
in error rate compared to AOI; AOFU-AFPV would require
more prompts over AOFU-AP, though yields a similar overall
accuracy rate.3 Moving forward, we focus our analysis only
on AOFU-AP (i.e., the current standard).
Instances where the user wants to deny a permission and the
policy instead allows it (false positives) are privacy violations,
because they expose more information to the application than
the user desires. Instances where the user wants to allow
a permission, but the policy denies it (false negatives) are
functionality losses. This is because the application is likely
to lose some functionality that the user desired when it is
incorrectly denied a permission. Privacy violations and func-
tionality losses were approximately evenly split between the
two categories for AOFU-AP: median privacy violations and
median functionality losses were 6.6% and 5.0%, respectively.
The AOFU policy works well for Defaulters, because—
by definition—they tend to be consistent after their initial
responses for each combination, which increases the accuracy
of AOFU. In contrast, the decisions of Contextuals vary due
to other factors beyond just the application requesting the
permission and the requested permission type. Hence, the ac-
curacy of AOFU for Contextuals is significantly lower than the
accuracy for Defaulters. This distinction shows that learning
privacy preferences for a significant portion of users requires a
deeper understanding of other factors affecting their decisions,
such as behavioral tendencies and contextual cues. As Table III
suggests, superficially adding more contextual variables (such
as visibility of the requesting application) does not necessarily
help to increase the accuracy of the AOFU policy.
Our estimated accuracy numbers for AOFU may be inflated
because AOFU in deployment (Android 6 and above) does
not filter out permission requests that do not reveal any
sensitive information. For example, an application can request
the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission to check whether
the phone has a specific location provider, which does not
leak sensitive information (i.e., the system will check whether
2The presented numbers—except for average prompt count, which was nor-
mally distributed—are median values, because the distributions were skewed.
3While AOFU-AF PV has greater median accuracy when examining De-
faulters and Contextuals separately, because the distributions are skewed, the
median overall accuracy is identical to AOFU-AP when combining the groups.
the requesting application has been granted the location per-
mission, but no location data will actually be revealed to
the application by this particular system call). Our AOFU
simulation uses the invoked function to determine if sensitive
data was actually accessed, and only prompts in those cases (in
the interest of avoiding any false positives). Currently deployed
AOFU in Marshmallow does not make this distinction. For
example, Android users will see a permission request prompt
when the application examines the list of location providers,
and if the permission is granted, the user will not subsequently
see prompts when location data is actually captured. Previous
work showed that 79% of first-time permission requests do
not reveal any sensitive information [38], and nearly 33.9% of
applications that request these sensitive permission types do
not access sensitive data at all. The majority of AOFU prompts
in Marshmallow are therefore effectively false positives, which
incorrectly serve as the basis for future decisions. Given this,
the average accuracy for AOFU is likely less than the numbers
presented in Table III. We therefore consider our estimates of
AOFU to be an upper bound.
VI. LEARNING PRIVACY PREFERENCES
Table III shows that a significant portion of users (the 47%
classified as Contextuals) make privacy decisions that depend
on factors other than the application requesting the permission,
the permission requested, and the visibility of the requesting
application. To make decisions on behalf of the user, we must
understand what other factors affect their privacy decisions.
We built a machine learning model trained and tested on our
labeled dataset of 4,224 prompts collected from 131 users over
the period of 42 days. This approach is equivalent to training a
model based on runtime prompts from hundreds of users and
using it to predict those users’ future decisions.
We focus the scope of this work by making the following as-
sumptions. We assume that the platform, i.e., the Android OS,
is trusted to manage and enforce permissions for applications.
We assume that applications must go through the platform’s
permission system to gain access to protected resources. We
assume that we are in a non-adversarial machine-learning
setting wherein the adversary does not attempt to circumvent
the machine-learned classifier by exploiting knowledge of its
decision-making process—though we do present a discussion
of this problem and potential solutions in Section IX.
A. Feature Selection
Using the behavioral, contextual, and aggregate features
shown in Table II, we constructed 16K candidate features,
formed by combinations of specific applications and actions.
Then, we selected 20 features by measuring Gini importance
through random forests [26], significance testing for corre-
lations, and singular value decomposition (SVD). SVD was
particularly helpful to address the sparsity and high dimension-
ality issues caused by features generated based on application
and activity usage. Table IV lists the 20 features used in the
rest of this work.
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Feature
Group
Feature Type
Behavioral
Features
(B)
Number of times a website is loaded to
the Chrome browser.
Numerical
Out of all visited websites, the proportion
of HTTPS-secured websites.
Numerical
The number of downloads through Chrome. Numerical
Proportion of websites requested location
through Chrome.
Numerical
Number of times PIN/Password was used to
unlock the screen.
Numerical
Amount of time spent unlocking the screen. Numerical
Proportion of times screen was timed out
instead of pressing the lock button.
Numerical
Frequency of audio calls. Numerical
Amount of time spent on audio calls. Numerical
Proportion of time spent on silent mode. Numerical
Runtime
Features
(R1)
Application visibility (True/False) Categorical
Permission type Categorical
User ID Categorical
Time of day of permission request Numerical
Aggregated
Features
(A)
Average denial rate for (A1)
application:permission:visibility
Numerical
Average denial rate for (A2)
applicationF :permission:visibility
Numerical
TABLE IV
THE COMPLETE LIST OF FEATURES USED IN THE ML MODEL
EVALUATION. ALL THE NUMERICAL VALUES UNDER BEHAVIORAL GROUP
ARE NORMALIZED PER DAY. WE USE ONE-HOT ENCODING FOR
CATEGORICAL VARIABLES. WE NORMALIZED NUMERICAL VARIABLES BY
MAKING EACH ONE A Z-SCORE RELATIVE TO ITS OWN AVERAGE.
The behavioral features (B) that proved predictive relate to
browsing habits, audio/call traits, and locking behavior. All
behavioral features were normalized per day/user and were
scaled in the actual model. Features relating to browsing
habits included the number of websites visited, the proportion
of HTTPS-secured links visited, the number of downloads,
and proportion of sites visited that requested location access.
Features relating to locking behavior included whether users
employed a passcode/PIN/pattern, the frequency of screen
unlocking, the proportion of times they allowed the screen to
timeout instead of pressing the lock button, and the average
amount of time spent unlocking the screen. Features under the
audio and call category were the frequency of audio calls, the
amount of time they spend on audio calls, and the proportion
of time they spent on silent mode.
Our runtime features (R1/R2) include the requesting appli-
cation’s visibility, permission requested, and time of day a
permission request occurred. Initially, we included the user
ID to account for user-to-user variance, but as we discuss
below, we subsequently removed it. Surprisingly, the name of
the application requesting the permission was not predictive.
Other features based on the requesting application, such as
application popularity, similarly failed to be predictive.
Different users may have different ways of perceiving
privacy threats posed by the same permission request. To
account for this, the learning algorithm should be able to
determine how each user treats permission requests in order
to accurately predict their future decisions. To quantify the
Feature Set Contextuals Defaulters Overall
R1 69.30% 95.80% 83.71%
R2 + B 69.48% 95.92% 83.93%
R2 + A 75.45% 99.20% 92.24%
TABLE V
THE MEDIAN ACCURACY OF THE MACHINE LEARNING MODEL FOR
DIFFERENT FEATURE GROUPS ACROSS DIFFERENT SUB POPULATIONS.
difference between users in how they perceive the threat
posed by the same set of permission requests, we intro-
duced a set of aggregate features that could be measured at
runtime and that might partly capture users’ privacy prefer-
ences. We compute the average denial rate for each unique
combination of application:permission:visibility (A1) and of
permission:applicationF
4:visibility (A2). These aggregate fea-
tures indicate how the user responded to previous prompts
associated with that combination. As expected, after we in-
troduced the aggregate features, the relative importance of the
user ID variable diminished and so we removed it (i.e., users
no longer needed to be uniquely identified). We define R2 as
R1 without the user ID.
B. Inference Based on Behavior
One of our main hypotheses is that passively observing
users’ behaviors could help infer their future privacy decisions.
To this end, we instrumented Android to collect a wide
array of behavioral data, listed in Table II. We categorize
our behavioral instrumentation into interaction with Android
privacy/security settings, locking behavior, audio settings and
call habits, web browsing habits, and application usage habits.
After the feature selection process (§VI-A), we found that
only locking behavior, audio habits, and web browsing habits
correlated with privacy behaviors. Please refer Appendix B for
more information on feature importance.
We trained an SVM model with an RBF kernel on only the
behavioral and runtime features listed in Table IV, excluding
user ID. The 5-fold cross validation accuracy (with random
splitting) was 83% across all users. This first setup assumes we
have prior knowledge of previous privacy decisions to a certain
extent from each user before inferring their future privacy
decisions, so it is primarily relevant after the user has been
using their phone for a while. However, the biggest advantage
of using behavioral data is that it can be observed passively
without any active user involvement (i.e., no prompting).
To measure the extent to which we can infer user privacy
decisions with absolutely no user involvement (and without
any prior data on a user), we utilized leave-one-out cross
validation. In this second setup, when a new user starts using a
smartphone, we assume there is a ML model which is already
trained with behavioral data and privacy decisions collected
from a selected set of other users. We then measured the effi-
cacy of such a model to predict the privacy decisions of a new
4The application running in the foreground when the permission is re-
quested by another application.
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user, purely based on passively observed behavior, without
prompting that new user at all. This is an even stricter lower
bound on user involvement, which essentially mandates that
a user has to make no effort to indicate privacy preferences,
something that no system currently does.
We performed leave-one-out cross validation for each of our
131 participants, meaning we predicted a single user’s privacy
decisions using a model trained using the data from the other
130 users’ privacy decisions and behavioral data. The only
input for each test user was the passively observed behavioral
data and runtime data surrounding each request. The model
yielded a median accuracy of 75%, which is a 3X improvement
over AOI. Furthermore, AOI requires users to make active
decisions during the installation of an application, which our
second model does not require.
Examining only behavioral data with leave-one-group-out
cross validation yielded a median accuracy of 56% for Contex-
tuals, while for Defaulters it was 93.01%. Although, prediction
using solely behavioral data fell short of AOFU-AP for Con-
textuals, it yielded a similar median accuracy for Defaulters;
AOFU-AP required 12 prompts to reach this level of accuracy,
whereas our model would not have resulted in any prompts.
This relative success presents the significant observation that
behavioral features, observed passively without user involve-
ment, are useful in learning user privacy preferences. This
provides the potential to open entirely new avenues of user
learning and reduce the risk of habituation.
C. Inference Based on Contextual Cues
Our SVM model with a RBF kernel produced the best ac-
curacy. The results in the remainder of this section are trained
and tested with five-fold cross validation with random splitting
for a SVM model with a RBF kernel using the ksvm library in
R. In all instances, the training set was bootstrapped with an
equal number of allow and deny data points to avoid training
a biased model. For each feature group, all hyperparameters
were tuned through grid search to achieve highest accuracy.
All the numerical values under the behavioral group were
normalized per day. We used one-hot encoding for categorical
variables. We normalized numerical variables by making each
one a z-score relative to its own average. Table V shows how
the median accuracy changes with different feature groups.
As a minor note, the addition of the mentioned behavioral
features to runtime features performed only marginally better;
this could be due to the fact that those two groups do not
complement each other in predictions. In this setup, we assume
that there is a single model across all the users of Android.
By incorporating user involvement in the form of prompts,
we can use our aggregate features to increase the accuracy
for Contextuals, slightly less so for Defaulters. The aggregate
features primarily capture how consistent users are for particu-
lar combinations (i.e., application:permission:visibility, appli-
cation:permission, appli-cationF :permission:visibility), which
greatly affects accuracy for Contextuals. Defaulters have high
accuracy with just runtime features (R1), as they are likely
to stick with a default allow or deny policy regardless of
the context surrounding a permission. Thus, even without any
aggregate features (which do not impart any new information
about this type of user), the model can predict privacy pref-
erences of Defaulters with a high degree of accuracy. On the
other hand, Contextuals are more likely to vary their decision
for a given permission request. However, as the accuracy
numbers in Table V suggest, this variance is correlated with
some contextual cues. The high predictive power of aggregate
features indicates that they may be capturing the contextual
cues used by Contextuals to make decisions.
The fact that both application:permission:visibility and
applicationF :permission:visibility are highly predictive (Ap-
pendix A) indicates that user responses for these combina-
tions are consistent. The high consistency could relate to
the notion that the visibility and the foreground application
(applicationF
5) are strong contextual cues people use to make
their privacy decisions; the only previously studied contextual
cue was the visibility of the application requesting the sensitive
data [38]. We offer a hypothesis for why foreground appli-
cation could be significant: the sensitivity of the foreground
application (i.e., high-sensitivity applications like banking,
low-sensitivity applications like games) might impact how
users perceive threats posed by requests. Irrespective of the
application requesting the data, users may be likely to deny
the request because of the elevated sense of risk. We discuss
this further in §IX.
The model trained on feature sets R2, A1 and A2 had the best
accuracy (and fewest privacy violations). For the remainder of
the paper, we will refer to this model unless otherwise noted.
We now compare AOFU-AP (the status quo as of Android
6.0 and above, presented in Table III) and our model (Table
V). Across all users, our model reduced the error rate from
15.38% to 7.76%, which is nearly a two-fold improvement.
Mispredictions (errors) in the ML model were split between
privacy violations and functionality losses (54% and 46%).
Deciding which error type is more acceptable is subjective
and depends on factors like the usability issues surrounding
functionality losses and gravity of privacy violations. However,
the (approximately) even split between the two error types
shows that the ML is not biased towards one particular deci-
sion (denying vs. allowing a request). Furthermore, the area
under the ROC curve (AUC), a metric used to measure the
fairness of a classifier, is also significantly better in the ML
model (0.936 as opposed to 0.796 for AOFU). This indicates
that the ML model is equally good at predicting when to
both allow and deny a permission request, while AOFU tends
to lean more towards one decision. In particular, with the
AOFU policy, users would experience privacy violations for
10.01% of decisions, compared to just 4.2% with the ML
model. Privacy violations are likely more costly to the user
than functionality loss, as denied data can always be granted
at a later time, but disclosed data cannot be taken back.
5Even when the requesting application is running visible to the user, the
foreground application could still be different from the requesting application
since the only visible cue of the requesting application could be a notification
on notification bar.
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While increasing the number of prompts improves classifier
accuracy, it plateaus after reaching its maximum accuracy, at
a point we call the steady state. For some users, the classifier
might not be able to infer their privacy preference effectively,
regardless of the number of prompts. As a metric to measure
the effectiveness of the ML model, we measure the confidence
of the model in the decisions it makes, based on prediction
class probabilities.6 In cases where the confidence of the model
is below a certain threshold, the system should use a runtime
prompt to ask the user to make an explicit decision. Thus,
we looked into the prevalence of low-confidence predictions
among the current predictions. With a 95% confidence inter-
val, on average across five folds, low-confidence predictions
accounted for less than 10% of all predictions. The remaining
high-confidence predictions (90% of all predictions) had an
average accuracy of 96.2%, whereas predictions with low
confidence were only predicted with an average accuracy of
72%. §VII-B goes into this aspect in detail and estimates the
rate at which users will see prompts in steady state.
The caveat in our ML model is that AOFU-AP only re-
sulted in 12 prompts on average per user during the study,
while our model averaged 24. The increased prompting stems
from multiple prompts for the same combination of appli-
cation:permission:visibility, whereas in AOFU, prompts are
shown only once for each application:permission combination.
During the study period, users on average saw 2.28 prompts
per unique combination. While multiple prompts per combi-
nation help the ML model to predict future decisions more
accurately, it risks habituation, which may eventually reduce
the reliability of the labeled data.
The evaluation setup mentioned in the current section does
not have a specific strategy to select the training set. It
randomly splits the data set into the 5 folds and picks 4 out
of 5 as the training set. In a real-world setup, the platform
needs a strategy to carefully select the training set so that the
platform can learn most of the user’s privacy preferences with
a minimum number of prompts. The next section presents an
in-depth analysis on possible ways to reduce the number of
prompts needed to train the ML model.
VII. LEARNING STRATEGY
This sections presents a strategy the platform can follow
in the learning phase of a new user. The key objective of
the learning strategy should be to learn most of the user’s
privacy preferences with minimal user involvement (prompts).
Once the model reaches adequate training, we can use model
decision confidence to analyze how the ML model performs
for different users and examine the tradeoff between user
involvement and accuracy. We also utilize the model’s confi-
dence on decisions to present a strategy that can further reduce
model error through selective permission prompting.
6To calculate the class probabilities, we used the KSVM library in R. It
employs a technique proposed by Platt et al. [23] to produce a numerical
value for each class’s probability.
A. Bootstrapping
The bootstrapping phase occurs when the ML model is
presented with a new user about whom the model has no
prior information. In this section, we analyze how the accuracy
improves as we prompt the user. Since the model presented
in §VI is a single model trained with data from all users, the
ML model can still predict a new user’s privacy decisions by
leveraging the data collected on other users’ preferences.
We measured the accuracy of the ML model as if it had
to predict each user’s prompt responses using a model trained
using other users’ data. Formally, this is called leave-one-out
cross-validation, where we remove all the prompt responses
from a single user. The training set contains all the prompt re-
sponses from 130 users and the test set is the prompt responses
collected from the single remaining user. The model had a
median accuracy of 66.6% (56.2% for Contextuals, 86.4%
for Defaulters). Although this approach does not prompt new
users, it falls short of AOFU. This no-prompt model behaves
close to random guessing for Contextuals and significantly
better for Defaulters. Furthermore, Wijesekera et al. found that
individuals’ privacy preferences varied a lot [38], suggesting
that utilizing other users’ decisions to predict decisions for a
new user has limited effectiveness, especially for Contextuals;
some level of prompting is necessary.
There are a few interesting avenues to explore when
determining the optimal way to prompt the user in the
learning phase. One option would be to follow the same
weighted-reservoir sampling algorithm mentioned in §III-A.
The algorithm is weighted by the frequency of each appli-
cation:permission:visibility combination. The most frequent
combination will have the highest probability of creating a
permission prompt and after the given combination reaches
a maximum of three prompts, the algorithm will no longer
consider that combination for prompting, giving the second
most frequent combination the new highest probability. Due
to frequency-weighting and multiple prompts per combina-
tion, the weighted-reservoir sampling approach requires more
prompts to cover a broader set of combinations. However,
AOFU prompts only once per combination without frequency-
weighting. This may be a useful strategy initially for a new
user since it allows the platform to learn about the users’
privacy preferences for a wide array of combinations with
minimal user interaction.
To simulate such an approach, we extend the aforemen-
tioned no-prompt model (leave-one-out validation). In the no-
prompt model, there was no overlap of users in the train and
test set. In the new approach, the training set includes the
data from other users as well as the new user’s responses to
the first occurrence of each unique combination of applica-
tion:permission:visibility. The first occurrence of each unique
combination simulates the AOFU policy. That is, this model is
bootstrapped using data from other users and then adopts the
AOFU policy to further learn the current user’s preferences.
The experiment was conducted using the same set of features
mentioned in §VI-A (R2 + A1 + A2 and an SVM with a
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Fig. 3. How the median accuracy varies with the number of seen prompts
RBF kernel). The test set only contained prompt responses
collected after the last AOFU prompt to ensure chronological
consistency.
Figure 3 shows how accuracy changes with the varying
number of AOFU prompts for Contextuals and Defaulters.
For each of the 131 users, we ran the experiment varying
the AOFU prompts from 1 to 12. We chose this upper bound
because, on average, a participant saw 12 different unique ap-
plication:permission combinations during the study period—
the current permission model in Android. AOFU relies on user
prompts for each new combination. The proposed ML model,
however, has the advantage of leveraging data collected from
other users to predict a combination not seen by the user; it can
significantly reduce user involvement in the learning phase.
After 12 prompts, accuracy reached 96.8% across all users.
Each new user starts off with a single model shared by
all new users and then gradually moves onto a separate
model trained with AOFU prompt responses. We analyze its
performance for Defaulters and Contextuals separately, finding
that it improves accuracy while reducing user involvement in
both cases, compared to the status quo.
We first examine how our model performs for Defaulters,
53% of our sample. Figure 3 shows that our model trained
with AOFU permission-prompt responses outperforms AOFU
from the very beginning. The model starts off with 96.6%
accuracy (before it reaches close to 100% after 6 prompts),
handily exceeding AOFU’s 93.33%. This is a 83.3% reduction
in permission prompts compared to AOFU-AP (the status quo).
Even with such a significant reduction in user involvement,
the new approach cuts the prediction error rate in half.
Contextuals needed more prompts to outperform the AOFU
policy; the hybrid approach matches AOFU-AP with just 7
prompts, a 42% reduction in prompts. With 12 permission
prompts, same as needed for AOFU-AP, the new approach
had reduced the error by 43% over AOFU-AP(the status quo).
The number of prompts needed to reach this level of accuracy
in the new approach is 25% less than what is needed for
AOFU-APV. We also observed that as the number of prompts
increased, the AUC of our predictions also similarly increased.
Overall, the proposed learning strategy reduced the error by
80% after 12 user prompts over AOFU-AP. Given, Defaulters
plateaus early in their learning cycle (after only 6 prompts),
the proposed learning strategy, on average, need 9 prompts to
reach it’s maximum capacity which is a 25% reduction in user
involvement over AOFU-AP.
Contextuals have a higher need for user involvement than
Defaulters, primarily because it is easy to learn about De-
faulters, as they are more likely to be consistent with early
decisions. On the other hand, Contextuals vary their decision
based on different contextual cues and require more user
involvement for the model to learn the cues used by each user.
Thus, it is important to find a way to differentiate between
Defaulters and Contextuals early in the bootstrapping phase to
determine which users require fewer prompts. The analysis of
our hybrid approach addresses the concern of a high number of
permission prompts initially for an ML approach. Over time,
accuracy can always be improved with more prompts.
Our new hybrid approach of using AOFU-style permission
prompts in the bootstrapping phase to train our model can
achieve much higher accuracy than AOFU, with significantly
fewer prompts. Having a learning strategy (use of AOFU) over
random selection helped to minimize the user involvement (24
vs. 9) while significantly reducing the error rate (7.6% vs.
3.2%) over a random selection of the training set.
B. Decision Confidence
In the previous section, we looked into how we can optimize
the learning phase by merging AOFU and the ML model to
reach higher accuracy with minimal user prompts. However,
for a small set of users, more permission prompts will not
increase accuracy, regardless of user involvement in the boot-
strapping phase. This could be due to the fact that a portion
of users in our dataset are making random decisions, or that
the features that our ML model takes into account are not
predictive of those users’ decision processes. While we do
not have the data to support either explanation, we examine
how we can measure whether the ML model will perform
well for a particular user and quantify how often it does not.
We present a method to identify difficult-to-predict users and
reduce permission prompting for those users.
While running the experiment in §VII-A, we also measured
how confident the ML model was for each decision it made. To
measure the ML model’s confidence, we record the probability
for each decision; since it is a binary classification (deny or
allow), the closer the probability is to 0.5, the less confident
it is. We then chose a class probability threshold above which
a decision would be considered a high-confidence decision.
In our analysis, we choose a class probability threshold of
0.6, since this value resulted in >96% accuracy for our fully-
trained model (≈25 prompts per user) for high-confidence
decisions, but this is a tunable threshold. Thus, in the re-
mainder of our analysis, decisions that the ML model made
with a probability of >0.60 were labeled as high-confidence
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decisions, while those made with a probability of <0.60 were
labeled as low-confidence decisions.
Since the most accurate version of AOFU uses 12 prompts,
we also evaluate the confidence of our model after 12 AOFU-
style prompts. This setup is identical to the bootstrapping
approach; the model we evaluate here is trained on responses
from other users and the first 12 prompts chosen by AOFU.
With this scheme, we found that 10 users (7.63% of 131
users) had at least one decision predicted with low confidence.
The remaining 92.37% of users had all privacy decisions
predicted with high confidence. Among those users whose
decisions were predicted with low confidence, the proportion
of low-confidence decisions on average accounted for 17.63%
(median = 16.67%) out of all their predicted decisions. With
a sensitive permission request once every 15 seconds [38],
prompting even for 17.63% of predictions is not practical.
Users who had low-confidence predictions had a median accu-
racy of 60.17%, compared to 98% accuracy for the remaining
set of users with only high-confidence predictions. Out of the
10 users who had low-confidence predictions, there were no
Defaulters. This further supports the observation in Figure 3
that Defaulters require a shorter learning period.
In a real-world scenario, after the platform (ML model)
prompts the user for the first 12 AOFU prompts, the plat-
form can measure the confidence of predicting unlabeled
data (sensitive permission requests for which the platform
did not prompt the user). If the proportion of low-confidence
predictions is below some threshold, the ML model can
be deemed to have successfully learned user privacy pref-
erences and the platform should keep on using the regu-
lar permission-prompting strategy. Otherwise, the platform
may choose to limit prompts (i.e., two per unique applica-
tion:permission:visibility combination). It should also be noted
that rather than having a fixed number of prompts (e.g., 12) to
measure the low-confidence proportion, the platform can keep
track of the low-confidence proportion as it prompts the user
according to any heuristic (i.e., unique combinations). If the
proportion does not decrease with the number of prompts, we
can infer that the ML model is not learning user preferences
effectively or the user is making random decisions, indicating
that limiting prompts and accepting lower accuracy could
be a better option for that specific user, to avoid excessive
prompting. However, depending on which group the user is
in (Contextual or Defaulter), the point at which the platform
could make the decision to continue or limit prompting could
change. In general, the platform should be able to reach this
deciding point relatively quickly for Defaulters.
Among participants with no low-confidence predictions, we
had a median error rate of 2% (using the new hybrid approach
after just 12 AOFU prompts); for the same set of users, AOFU
reached a median error rate of 13.3%. However, using AOFU,
a user in that set would have needed an average of 15.11
prompts to reach that accuracy. Using the ML model, a user
would need just 9 prompts on average (Defaulters require far
fewer prompts, dropping the average); the model only requires
60% of the prompts that AOFU requires. Even with far fewer
prompts in the learning phase, the ML model achieves a
84.61% reduction in error rate as compared to AOFU.
While our model may not perform well for all users, it does
seem to work quite well for the majority of users (92.37% of
our sample). We provide a way of quickly identifying users for
whom our system does not perform well, and propose limiting
prompts to avoid excessive user burden for those users, at the
cost of reduced efficacy. In the worst case, we could simply
employ the AOFU model for users our system does not work
well for, resulting in a multifaceted approach that is at least
as good as the status quo for all users.
C. Online Model
Our proposed system relies on training models on a trusted
server, sending it to client phones (i.e., as a weight vector),
and having phones make classifications. By utilizing an online
learning model, we can train models incrementally as users
respond to prompts over time. There are two key advantages
to this: (i) this model adapts to changing user preferences over
time; (ii) training models on multiple users’ data allows more
labeled data points for training.
Our scheme requires two components: a feature extraction
and storage mechanism on the phone (a small extension to our
existing instrumentation) and a machine learning pipeline on
a trusted server. The phone sends feature vectors to the server
every few prompts, and the server responds with a weight
vector representing the newly trained classifier. To bootstrap
the process, the server’s models can be initialized with a model
trained on a few hundred users, such as our single model across
all users. Since each user contributes data points over time,
the online model adapts to changing privacy preferences even
if they conflict with previous data. When using this scheme,
each model takes less than 10KB to store. With our current
model, each feature and weight vector are at most 3 KB each,
resulting in at most 6KB of data transfer per day.
To evaluate the accuracy of our online model, we trained
a classifier using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with five-
fold cross validation on our 4,224-point data set. This served
as the bootstrapping phase. We then simulated receiving the
remaining data one-at-a-time in timestamp order. Any features
that changed with time (e.g., running averages for aggregate
features, event counts) were computed with each incoming
data point, creating a snapshot of features as the phone would
see it. We then tested accuracy on the chronologically last
20% of our dataset. Our SGD classifier had 93.8% accuracy
(AUC=0.929). We attribute the drop in accuracy (compared
to our offline model) to the fact that running averages take
multiple data points to reach steady-state, causing some earlier
predictions to be incorrect.
A natural concern with a trusted server is compromise.
To address this concern, we do not send any personally-
identifiable data to the server. Furthermore, features sent to
the server have been scaled; they are reported in standard
deviations from the mean, not in raw values.
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VIII. CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY
Contextual integrity is a conceptual framework that helps
explain why most permission models fail to protect user
privacy—they often do not take the context surrounding pri-
vacy decisions into account. In addressing this issue, we pro-
pose an ML model that infers when context has changed. That
is, if the system knows that a user is comfortable sharing data
with a particular application under one set of circumstances,
it should not bother her with a permission request when the
same application requests access to the same data under similar
circumstances in the future. However, it should behave dif-
ferently when those circumstances have changed. We believe
that this is an important first step towards operationalizing the
notion of contextual integrity. In this section, we explain the
observations that we made in §VI-C within the context of the
contextual integrity framework proposed by Barth et al. [5].
Contextual integrity provides a conceptual framework to
better understand how users make privacy decisions; we use
Barth et al.’s formalized model [5] as a framework in which to
view Android permission models. Barth et al. model parties as
communicating agents (P ) knowing information represented
as attributes (T ). A knowledge state κ is defined as a subset
of P×P×T . We use κ = (p, q, t) to mean that agent p knows
attribute t of agent q. Agents play roles (R) in contexts (C).
For example, an agent can be a game application, and
have the role of a game provider in an entertainment context.
Knowledge transfer happens when information is communi-
cated between agents; all communications can be represented
through a series of traces (κ, (p, r), a), which are combinations
of a knowledge state κ, a role state (p, r), and a communica-
tion action a (information sent). The role an agent plays in a
given context helps determine whether an information flow is
acceptable for a user. Communications can only occur when
they follow the norms of context; the relationship between the
agent sending the information and the role of the agent ((p, r))
receiving it must follow these norms, too.
With the Android permission model, the same framework
can be applied. Both the user and the third-party applica-
tion are communicating agents, and the information to be
transferred is the sensitive data requested by the applica-
tion. When a third-party application requests permission to
access a guarded resource (e.g., location), knowledge of the
guarded resource is transferred from the one agent (i.e., the
user/platform) to another agent (i.e., the third-party applica-
tion). The extent to which a user expects a given request
depends not on the agent (the application requesting the data),
but on the role that agent is playing in that context. This
explains why the application as a feature itself (i.e., application
name) was not predictive in our models: this feature does not
represent the role when determining whether it is unexpected.
While it is hard, from the platform, to determine the exact role
an application is playing, the visibility of the application hints
at its role. For instance, when the user is using Google Maps to
navigate, it is playing a different role from when Google Maps
is running in the background without the user’s knowledge.
We believe that this is the reason why the visibility of the
requesting application is significant: it helps the user to infer
the role played by the application requesting the permission.
The user expects applications in certain roles to access re-
sources depending on the context in which the request is made.
We believe that the foreground application sets this context.
Thus a combination of the role and the context decides whether
an information flow is expected to occur or not. Automatically
inferring the exact context of a request (e.g., how data will be
used, whether it will be shared with others, etc.) is likely an
intractable problem. However, for our purposes, it is possible
that we need to only infer when context has changed, or
rather, when data is being requested in a context that is no
longer acceptable to the user. Based on our data, we believe
that features based on foreground application and visibility
are most useful for this purpose, amongst the features that we
collected during this study.
We now combine all of this into a concrete example within
the contextual integrity framework: If a user is using Google
Maps to reach a destination, the application can play the
role of a navigator in a geolocation context, whereby the
user feels comfortable sharing her location. In contrast, if the
same application requests location while running as a service
invisible to the user, the user may not want to give this service
the same information. Background applications play the role
of “passive listeners” in most contexts; this role as perceived
by the user may be why background applications are likelier
to violate privacy expectations and consequently be denied
information by users.
AOFU primarily focuses on controlling access through
rules for application:permission combinations. Thus, AOFU
neglects the role played by the application (visibility) and
relies purely on the agent (the application) and the information
subject (permission type). This explains why AOFU is wrong
in nearly one-fifth of cases. Based on Table III, both AOFU-
VA (possibly identifying the role played by the application)
and AOFU-AFPV (possibly identifying the current context
because of the current foreground application-AF ) have higher
accuracy than the other AOFU combinations. However, as the
contextual integrity framework suggests, the permission model
has to take both the role and the current context into account
before making an accurate decision. AOFU (and other models
that only consider the application name and permission type)
only makes it possible to consider a single aspect, a limitation
that does not apply to our model.
While the data presented in this work suggest the impor-
tance of capturing context to more accurately protect user
privacy, more work is needed along these lines to fully under-
stand how people use context to make decisions in the Android
permission model. Crucially, research to better define context.
Nevertheless, we believe we contribute a significant initial step
towards applying contextual integrity to improve smartphone
privacy by dynamically regulating permissions.
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IX. DISCUSSION
The primary goal of this research was to improve the
accuracy of the Android permission system so that it more
correctly aligns with user privacy preferences. We began with
four hypotheses: (i) that the currently deployed AOFU policy
frequently violates user privacy; (ii) that the contextual infor-
mation it ignores is useful; (iii) that a ML-based classifier can
account for this contextual information and thus improve on
the status quo; and (iv) that passively observable behavioral
traits can be used to infer privacy preferences.
To test these hypotheses, we performed the first large-scale
study on the effectiveness of AOFU permission systems in
the wild, which showed that hypotheses (i) and (ii) hold.
We further built an ML classifier that took user permission
decisions along with observations of user behaviors and the
context surrounding those decisions to show that (iii) and (iv)
hold. Our results show that existing systems have significant
room for improvement, and other permission-granting systems
may benefit from applying our results.
A. Limitations of Permission Models
Our field study confirms that users care about their privacy
and are wary of permission requests that violate their expec-
tations. We observed that 95% of participants chose to block
at least one permission request; in fact, the average denial
rate was 60%—a staggering amount given that Android’s
earlier AOI model permits all permission requests once an
application is installed. This denial rate implies that AOI
correctly regulates permission requests only one in four times.
While AOFU improves over the AOI model, it still violates
user privacy around one in seven times, as users deviate from
their initial responses to permission requests. This amount is
significant because of the high frequency of sensitive permis-
sion requests: a 15% error rate yields thousands of privacy
violations for each user per day. It further shows that AOFU’s
correctness assumption—that users make binary decisions
based only on the application:permission combination—is
incorrect. Users take a richer space of information into account
when making decisions about permission requests.
B. Our ML-Based Model
We show that ML techniques are effective at learning from
both the user’s previous decisions and the current environmen-
tal context in order to predict whether to grant permissions on
the user’s behalf. In fact, our techniques achieve better results
than the methods currently deployed on millions of phones
worldwide—while imposing significantly less user burden.
Our work incorporates elements of the environmental con-
text into a machine-learning model. This better approximates
user decisions by finding factors relevant for users that are
not encapsulated by the AOFU model. In fact, our ML model
reduces the errors made by the AOFU model by 75%. Our
ML model’s 97% accuracy is a substantial improvement over
AOFU’s 85% and AOI’s 25%; the latter two of which comprise
the status quo in the Android ecosystem.
Our research shows that many users make neither random
nor fixed decisions: the environmental context plays a signif-
icant role in user decision-making. Automatically detecting
the precise context surrounding a request for sensitive data is
an incredibly difficult problem (e.g., inferring how data will
be used), and is potentially intractable. However, to better
support user privacy, that problem does not need to be solved;
instead, we show that systems can be improved by using
environmental data to infer when context has changed. We
found that the most predictive factors in the environmental
context were whether the application requesting the permission
is visible, and if not, what foreground application actually
was visible. These are both strong contextual cues used by
users, insofar as they allowed us to better predict changes
in context. Our results show that ML techniques have great
potential in improving user privacy, by allowing us to infer
when context has changed, and therefore when users would
want data requests to be brought to their attention.
C. Reducing the User Burden
Our work is also novel in using passively observable data
to infer privacy decisions: we show that we can predict
a user’s preferences without any permission prompts. Our
model trained solely on behavioral traits yields a three-fold
improvement over AOI; for Defaulters—who account for 53%
of our sample—it was as accurate as AOFU-AP. These results
demonstrate that we can match the status quo without any
active user involvement (i.e., the need for obtrusive prompts).
These results imply that learning privacy preferences may be
done entirely passively, which, to our knowledge, has not
yet been attempted in this domain. Our behavioral feature
set provides a promising new direction to guide research in
creating permission models that minimize user burden.
The ML model trained with contextual data and past
decisions also significantly reduced the user burden while
achieving higher accuracy than AOFU. The model yielded
an 81% reduction in prediction errors while reducing user
involvement by 25%. The significance of this observation is
that by reducing the risk of habituation, it increases reliability
when user input is needed.
D. User- and Permission-Tailored Models
Our ML-based model incorporates data from all users into
a single predictive model. It may be the case, however, that
a collection of models tailored to particular types of users
outperforms our general-purpose model—provided that the
correct model is used for the particular user and permission.
To determine if this is true, we clustered users into groups
based first on their behavioral features, and then their denial
rate, to see if we could build superior cluster-tailored ML
models. Having data for only 131 users, however, resulted
in clusters too small to carry out an effective analysis. We
note that we also created a separate model for each sensitive
permission type, using data only for that permission. Our
experiments determined, however, that these models were no
better (and often worse) than our general model. It is possible
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that such tailored models may be more useful when our system
is implemented at scale.
E. Attacking the ML Model
Attacking the ML model to get access to users’ data without
prompting is a legitimate concern [4]. There are multiple ways
an adversary can influence the proposed permission model: (i)
imposing an adversarial ML environment [27]; (ii) polluting
the training set to bias the model to accept permissions; and
(iii) manipulating input features in order to get access without
user notification. We assume in this work that the platform is
not compromised; a compromised platform will degrade any
permission model’s ability to protect resources.
A thorough analysis on this topic is outside of our scope.
Despite that, we looked at the possibility of manipulating
features to get access to resources without user consent. None
of the behavioral features used in the model can be influ-
enced, since that would require compromising the platform.
An adversary can control the runtime features for a given
permission request by specifically choosing when to request
the permission. We generated feature vectors that encompassed
every adversary-controlled value and combination from our
dataset, and tested them on our model. We did not find any
conclusive evidence that the adversary can exploit the ML
model by manipulating the input features to get access to
resources without user consent.
As this is not a comprehensive analysis on attack vectors,
it is possible that there exists a scenario where the adversary
is able to access sensitive resources without prompting the
user first. Our preliminary analysis suggests that they may
be non-trivial, but more work is needed to study and prevent
such attacks. In particular, to protect against adversarial ML
techniques and formally examining feature brittleness.
F. Experimental Caveat
We repeat a caveat about our experimental data: users were
free to deny permissions without any consequences. We ex-
plicitly informed participants in our study that their decisions
to deny permission requests would have no impact on the
actual behavior of their applications. This is important to note
because if an application is denied a permission, it may exhibit
undefined behavior or lose important functionality. If these
consequences are imposed on users, they may decide that the
functionality is more important than their privacy decision.
If we actually denied permissions, users’ decisions may
skew towards a decreased denial rate. The denial rates in
our experiments therefore represent the actual privacy prefer-
ences of users and their expectations of reasonable application
behavior—not the result of choosing between application func-
tionality and privacy. We believe that how people react when
choosing between functionality and privacy preferences is an
important research question beyond the scope of this paper.
We believe that there are important unanswered questions
about how to solve the technical hurdles surrounding enforcing
restrictive preferences with minimal usability issues. In fact,
researchers have noted that many applications crash when
permissions are denied [11]. As a first step towards build-
ing a platform that does not force users to choose between
their privacy preferences and required functionality, we must
develop an environment where permissions appear—to the
application—to be allowed, but in reality only spurious or
artificial data is provided.
We leave as future work the replication of this experiment
with consequences for denied application permissions. We ex-
pect that a considerable portion of the default-deny contingent
would become more selective with their privacy preferences
in the presence of actual permission denial. Such a change,
however, will not limit this contribution, since our proposed
model was effective in guarding resources of the users who
are selective in their decision making—the proposed classifier
was able to reduce the error rate of Contextuals by 44%.
G. Types of Users
We presented a categorization of users based on the sig-
nificance that the application’s visibility played towards their
individual privacy decisions. We believe that in an actual
permission denial setting, the distribution will be different
from what was observed in our study. Our categorization’s
significance, however, motivates a deeper analysis on under-
standing the factors that divide Contextuals and Defaulters.
We believe that visibility is an important factor in this division
but there may be others that are more significant. More work
needs to be done to explore how Contextuals make decisions
and which behaviors correlate with their decisions.
H. User Interface Panel
Any model that predicts user decisions has the risk of
making incorrect predictions. Making predictions on a user’s
behalf, however, is necessary because permissions are re-
quested by applications with too high a frequency for manual
examination. Thus, platforms need to make these predictions
and should strive to be as accurate as possible. While we do
not expect any system to be able to obtain perfect accuracy,
we do expect that our 97% accuracy can be improved upon.
One plausible way of improving the accuracy of the per-
mission model is to empower the user to review and make
changes on how the ML model makes decisions through a user
feedback panel. A major benefit is that users would be able to
go back and review the decisions made by the ML model. It
would also allow users to adjust these decisions according to
their preferences, thereby correcting errors. This gives users
recourse to correct undesirable decisions. The UI panel could
also be used to reduce the usability issues and functionality
loss stemming from permission denial. The panel should help
the user figure out which rule incurred the functionality loss
and to change it accordingly. A user may also use this to adjust
their settings as their privacy preferences evolve over time.
I. Conclusions
We have shown a number of important results. Users care
about their privacy: they deny a significant number of requests
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to access sensitive data. Existing permission models for An-
droid phones still result in significant privacy violations. Users
may allow permissions some times, while denying them at
others, which means that there are more factors that go into the
decision-making process than simply the application name and
the permission type. We collected real-world data from 131
users and found that application visibility and the current fore-
ground application were important factors in user decisions.
We used the data we collected to build a machine-learning
model to make automatic permission decisions. One of our
models, without any user prompting, had a comparable error
rate to what AOFU has, and another of our models reduced
the number of errors by 81% with even less prompting.
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APPENDIX A
INFORMATION GAIN OF FEATURES
Contextuals Defaulters Overall
A1 0.4839 0.6444 0.5717
A2 0.4558 0.6395 0.5605
Permission 0.0040 0.0038 0.0050
Time 0.0487 0.1391 0.0130
Visibility 0.0015 0.0007 0.0010
TABLE VI
FEATURE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTUAL FEATURES
APPENDIX B
INFORMATION GAIN OF BEHAVIORAL FEATURES
Feature Importance
Amount of time spent on audio calls 0.327647825
Frequency of audio calls 0.321291184
Proportion of times screen was timed out
instead of pressing the lock button
0.317631096
Number of times PIN was used to
unlock the screen.
0.305287288
Number of screen unlock attempts 0.299564131
Amount of time spent unlocking the screen 0.29930659
Proportion of time spent on loud mode 0.163166296
Proportion of time spent on silent mode 0.138469725
Number of times a website is loaded to
the Chrome browser
0.094996437
Out of all visited websites, the proportion
of HTTPS-secured websites.
0.071096898
Number of times Password was used to
unlock the screen
0.067999523
Proportion of websites requested location
through Chrome
0.028404167
Time 0.019799623
The number of downloads through Chrome 0.014619351
Permission 0.001461635
Visibility 0.000162166
TABLE VII
FEATURE IMPORTANCE OF BEHAVIORAL FEATURES
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